SacredDocs

Risk

How your funds are protected, what was tested, and what each result shows.

How your funds are protected

Your funds are protected by 4 layers of backstops before a loss touches your principal.

A losswhat one layercannot coverfalls to the next1The trader's capitalit sits under the financing2Primary protectionearned manager cash, target 0.4% of approved financing3Tail protectionearned manager cash, target 0.6% of approved financing4Pilot backstopcapital set aside from Sacred's raise for the pilot phase5Every depositor of the vaultin proportion, through active NAV
When a pledged asset falls, the loss moves through these layers in order. Four layers stand in front of depositor principal.

Each pool stands alone. A loss in Earn's vault reaches neither Borrow's pool nor the company's operating cash. Borrow has its own four layers: the borrower's collateral, the primary and tail reserve sleeves, and the pilot backstop during its pilot.

Protection does not start at zero. The pilot backstop, a small portion of the capital Sacred raises from investors, protects the pilot phase of both Earn and Borrow while primary and tail protection build.

Four controls sit around that order:

Wallet controlYou hold your own keys, through an embedded wallet you can export or a wallet you connect
Contract securityNew contracts go through independent review before launch, followed by a small bounded pilot
Collateral controlsPledged assets are never lent, staked or reused. Coverage limits, price checks and depth caps govern every sale
Withdrawal conditionsWithdrawals rank ahead of new financing. Earn pays from idle cash, then a daily queue. Repayment and exit stay open during pauses

The layers absorb trading losses. Failures of a contract, an oracle, USDC or the chain sit outside them, and are listed under known risks.

Reviews and audits

Smart-contract auditNot yet
Shariah reviewNot yet
Risk research and test resultsBelow

Reading the numbers

Three kinds of number appear below and they are different things:

KindWhat it isExample
Historical lossWhat a replay of past prices producedNo principal loss at 2× in the Binance normal replay
Planning allowanceA budget line for expected loss5 bps a year on financing
Policy cushionCash chosen to absorb losses1% of approved financing

None of them is a statistically certified lifetime guarantee. Nothing here was run on Arc. The results are price history from centralized exchanges.

Earn and Trade

The final tiers

LeverageTrigger / restoreInitial price roomProtection stockStatus
2×160% / 190%19.7%1.0%Opens first
2.5×145% / 160%12.6%1.5%Opens gradually
3×130% / 145%12.9%9.0%Opens gradually
3.5×125% / 135%10.2%10.0%Opens gradually
4×120% / 130%9.4%14.0%Opens gradually
4.5×116% / 125%9.1%17.0%Opens gradually
5×115% / 123%7.2%17.0%Opens gradually

Stocks are chosen from 1.10 × the larger one or three-month-block four-hour annual ES99, rounded up, with floors of 1%, 1.5% and 9% at 2×, 2.5× and 3×. Nested financing caps limit the share above 2× (ladder). There is no diversification credit.

The full hourly history

Binance BTC and ETH, January 2018 to September 2026, about 76,000 overlapping 14-day cohorts per asset and configuration. Missing timestamps are kept as outages, so adverse windows are not deleted.

Scenario, 2×Result
Normal, 1 hourNo principal loss
Four-hour delay, 3% friction, BinanceNo principal loss
Four-hour delay, 3% friction, OKX ETHSix losing daily cohorts, worst individual loss 3.42%. Maximum annual book loss 0.835% of nominal ETH capacity, about 0.418% on an equal BTC and ETH book
Bybit, July 2021 onwardNo normal-case principal loss
24-hour outage, 5% friction, BinanceWorst individual loss 21.71% BTC, 27.99% ETH. Worst rolling year 14.45% of peak financing

The 24-hour case is a separate emergency. The 1% routine stock does not cover it.

Partial sales are ordinary. In replay, 9.4%, 11.2% and 14.3% of 2× positions entered in bull, sideways and bear conditions saw a forced sale.

Normal annual principal-loss rates are zero at 2× and 2.5×, and about 0.107%, 0.68% and 1.18% of actual financing at 3×, 4× and 5×.

The realistic-delay panel

224 re-verified minute archives: 105 systematic monthly dates plus seven stress dates, for each asset. Each observation starts hypothetically exactly at the trigger and takes the worst fall over the detection minute plus five more, with 1% exit friction. It is a gap test, not a continuous replay or a liquidation frequency.

Maximum shortfall on stress datesBTCETH
3× at 130%0%0%
4× at 120%1.07%4.80%
5× at 115%5.19%8.77%

The largest stress-date gaps were 16.71% on BTC and 19.85% on ETH. Every tier had zero hypothetical shortfall on the systematic dates. Windows are not independent, and these frequencies cannot be annualized.

A saturated mix

At the most concentrated mix the caps allow, with correlated losses summed before aggregation, worst rolling annual loss is 0.186% in the one-hour case and 0.856% in the four-hour case, against total approved capacity. ES99 is 0.336% and 1.489%. The 2.6% stock exceeds those modeled cases. The 24-hour emergency still loses 16.53% in the worst historical rolling year.

Month resampling produced 30,000 one-year paths from 103 complete months. Those are not 30,000 independent years.

What SIFT adds, and what it does not

Account-level limits sit on top of the position-level ones, and they answer different questions.

CoverageAccount drawdown
MeasuresOne position's asset against its debtOne account's unit NAV against its high-water mark
Trigger160% at 2×10% pauses growth, 20% halves capacity, 30% freezes it
EffectPartial sale of the assetLess or no new financing. Existing sales unchanged
  • Common shocks. Many wallets buying BTC are one correlated liquidation. A transparent score cannot replace aggregate asset and route limits. Production limits must come from execution evidence, and 1%-of-financing protection is not a bound on an arbitrary crash.
  • Sticky limits. Risk ceilings and freezes have no automatic recovery in v1.
  • Identity. Wallet splitting is limited by no double pledge, one newcomer budget and aggregate caps, not by knowing who is who.
  • Oracles. Canonical daily prices and rounds are versioned settings still to be chosen. Stale or missing data fails closed for new financing.
  • Selection can backfire. Aggressive selection can leave capital idle and reduce income.

Borrow

Borrow's policy is 45% entry, 62.5% liquidation and 50% restoration, the last two measured against full contractual debt. The 62.5% and 50% figures are controls chosen by judgment. The tests below describe how they behaved against history.

Test, 2018 to 2026, 30-day sales at 8%BTC annual loss on financingETH annual loss on financingEqual book
Binance one hour, 0.1% friction00No shortfall
Binance four-hour path, 3%00No shortfall
OKX four-hour path, 3%00.02462%Worst year 0.101%, ES99 0.162%
Binance 24-hour path, 5%1.4886%1.5044%Worst year 12.24%, ES99 18.55%

Sources are Binance, OKX and Bybit, with sampled minute gaps. Kraken lacks comparable history and no replay is claimed for it. The Bybit window excludes March 2020. At the 62.5% trigger, gross collateral is 1.6 times full debt, leaving 37.5% of further price fall before debt exceeds collateral, less slippage and costs.

What the 1% reserve covers. It is about 6.2 times the four-hour ES99, which is a judgment margin. The day-long emergency would need about 19% of financing, so it remains uncovered. Investors bear it.

Sale frequency. In healthy-repayment replay, 8.99% of BTC and 19.31% of ETH daily cohorts saw a price liquidation.

Route controls. A route's fixed-debt book cannot exceed 25% of independently measured USDC bid depth within five minutes at 1% slippage. Common bridge, oracle or custodian exposure counts together.

Maturity concentration. At most 5% of approved financing due in one day, and 30% in seven.

Price controls. New-risk pricing must be 60 seconds fresh or better, with two independently operated cross-checks. Over 1% disagreement, or USDC outside 0.98 to 1.02, freezes new risk. Debt health prices USDC at max(1, validated USDC/USD), so a depeg cannot create borrowing power. Repayment and top-ups stay open. Enforcement needs valid prices and bounded quotes.

Governance. Risk increases carry a 35-day timelock, apply prospectively and stay within the mandate. Reductions and pauses can be immediate.

Known risks across all three products

RiskWhat could happenWhat limits it
Contract bugLoss of deposits or pledged assetsAudits, caps and a bounded pilot. No audit has happened
Stale or wrong priceBad sales, or new risk at a wrong priceFreshness and cross-checks. Enforcement needs valid prices
Thin Arc marketsSales fail or fill badlyDepth caps and route limits. Arc depth is unmeasured, and a route is at zero capacity until proven
Keeper delaySales arrive lateA 60-second target, unmeasured. Keepers are permissionless
Wrapper or bridge failurecirBTC or WETH loses value or redemptionIndependent wrapper checks and route caps. BTC and ETH prices cannot prove backing
USDC freeze or depegCircle can block an address. A depeg hits every poolNew-risk bands. Nothing inside the design fixes a freeze
Arc outageNo sales or exits during a haltNothing inside the design
Withdrawal waitEarn depends on settlement. Borrow investors are committed for 12 monthsWithdrawal priority, idle floors and maturity limits
Admin keysA captured key changes future settingsTimelocks, bounded limits, and pauses that protect exits
RegulationEligibility differs by country. Leverage is restricted in some, including TürkiyeLegal review before each market
ShariahA board declines a key structureThe design changes. See Shariah

Unknown or untested

  • Live depth, spreads, MEV, keeper and oracle behavior on Arc.
  • Real borrower repayment and real trader behavior.
  • Depositor willingness to accept conservation terms.
  • Anything a professional audit would find.
  • A crash worse than the history above. The past does not bound the future.

Sacred is pre-launch. No Shariah board has reviewed it, nothing is audited, and every number is a proposal, a model or a backtest result, not a promise. These pages are not an offer to sell anything.